Randomized controlled trials of antidepressants: clinically and scientifically irrelevant by unknown
Randomized controlled trials of antidepressants: clinically
and scientifically irrelevant
David Cohen & David H. Jacobs
Received: 22 September 2006 /Accepted: 11 January 2007 /Published online: 1 March 2007
# Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2007
Abstract This contribution to the “antidepressant debate”
focuses on the validity of randomized controlled trials
(RCTs). We argue that: (a) made-up psychiatric diagnostic
categories destroy the purpose and logic of the RCT as a
medical experiment, (b) RCTs do everything possible to
methodologically stamp out high placebo response rates
rather than reveal their clinical implications, (c) assessing a
psychoactive drug’s effects greatly exceeds the RCT’s
purpose, requiring substantial investigation on normal
volunteers, and (d) adverse drug reactions remain under-
studied, under-recognized, and underappreciated, in parallel
with the muting of subjects’ voice and the reliance on
surrogate measures of efficacy. The standard psychophar-
macotherapy RCT has lost virtually all clinical and
scientific relevance, and needs complete revamping. The
backdrop for the discussion is American biopsychiatry’s
insistence that personal difficulties must be viewed as the
expression of idiopathic somatic diseases and the pharma-
ceutical industry’s dominance of the entire drug treatment
research enterprise.
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Introduction
We were invited by the editors of this journal to contribute
to what has been called “the antidepressant debate” [1] on
the basis of a 1999 article [2] in which we endeavored to
address topics receiving little attention in medical and
psychiatric journals: whether psychiatric drugs’ “therapeu-
tic” effects might be more sensibly considered “toxic” [3];
how to understand the large disparities (in range, inci-
dence, severity) between adverse drug reactions (ADRs)
reported in randomized controlled trials (RCTs) and from
other treatment venues; and the reluctance of the field, as a
whole, to study psychiatric drugs as psychoactive drugs,
that is, drugs with diverse, diffuse, and variable effects on
mental life regardless of why they are used.
Our concerns and methodological suggestions, falling
outside of “normal science” as it was then and is still
understood, were not taken up by psychiatric drug
research. Nevertheless, in the intervening years, changes
from without—investigative reporting, criminal and product
liability cases, whistle blowing and leaks, and the actions of
regulatory bodies outside the U.S.—greatly contributed to
an unmistakable crisis of confidence in all industry-
sponsored drug research [4]. Recently, for example, the
former editor of the British Medical Journal proposed that
medical journals should cease publishing all clinical trials
and simply critically evaluate them for readers [5]. In
psychiatric drug research, the revelatory writings of one
man, David Healy, based on his access to otherwise
inaccessible internal industry documents in the course of
appearing as expert witness in numerous cases, greatly
contributed.
In the present paper, we revisit and reformulate some of
the concerns and suggestions covered in our earlier article,
and we try to expand the boundaries of the usual debate by
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arguing that: (a) essentially made-up psychiatric diagnostic
categories destroy the logic and purpose of the RCT as a
medical experiment, (b) fully assessing a psychoactive
drug’s psychosocial consequences vastly exceeds the com-
paratively minuscule purpose of an RCT, and (c) adverse
drug reactions remain understudied, under-recognized,
under-reported, underappreciated, in parallel with the mut-
ing of subjects’ voice and reliance on surrogate measures of
efficacy. This suggests to us that the standard RCT in
psychopharmacotherapy has lost virtually all clinical and
scientific relevance and needs complete revamping—some-
thing easier said than done. To remind readers, standard or
conventional RCTs refer to investigations with the following
typical characteristics: (a) random assignment of psychiatric
patients to treatment or placebo or comparison group; (b)
about 6 to 8 weeks duration, (c) where the researcher is not
well acquainted with the subject before the initiation of drug
treatment, (d) where data on patients’ clinical status and
drug effects derive mainly from structured, preestablished
questionnaires, (e) where data gathering on adverse effects
occurs during brief, focused encounters between researcher
and subject, (f) where no information about drug effects is
obtained from individuals who know the subject well and
are able to observe the subject in diverse and natural
settings, and (g) where only data obtained while subjects are
treated are considered relevant.
What is treated in an antidepressant drug RCT?
Antidepressants do not treat a specific, identifiable illness,
disease, disorder, or condition called “clinical depression”
or “major depressive disorder” (MDD). Such a construct is
contained in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders, Fourth edition (DSM-IV) [6], but it
cannot be validated with respect to either etiopathogenesis,
pathophysiology, distinctive symptomatology, course, out-
come, or response to treatment. Some biological psychia-
trists have regularly noted that it is pointless to aggregate a
group of subjects on the basis of symptomatic diagnostic
criteria and then pretend that the group so aggregated really
suffers from the same condition [7, 8]. Since DSM-III, the
DSM system has rested on the medically conventional
principle that psychopathology can be divided into distinct
categories and has postulated hundreds of autonomous
disorders (although, it has also stated in its introduction that
such distinctions cannot be supported empirically—but no
one pays attention to this [9]). No psychiatric disorder
construct began its official existence on the basis of con-
vincing evidence of ontological reality, and it has become
increasingly clear that such constructs simply do not
conform to evidence [10–13]. As a scientific taxonomy,
DSM is on the way out because valid case identification
(“who has what disease or disorder?”) has proven to be a
chimera.
Careful study of the timing and appearance of clinical
symptoms indicates the importance of history, context,
drama, circumstances [14], yet MDD is conceptualized and
presented in the DSM-IV as an endogenous, idiopathic
medical illness with numerous possible guises that the
physician/diagnostician must see through in order to detect
the presence of a single clinical entity and unconnected to
the patient’s social history and current social–interpersonal
situation. But “depression” as a distinct medical illness is
simply made up, and so all reports of treating “it” in
placebo-controlled RCTs begin by fundamentally distorting
the nature of the research subject’s complex and multifac-
eted problem. That problem involves a completely unique
personal “story” and cannot be meaningfully formulated
apart from it and apart from social history. The DSM’s axis
4 allows the examination of social and environmental
conditions, but the overall commitment to a strictly medical
view of “psychiatric disorders” is such that diagnosis need
not include any of these considerations. In the absence of a
unique and complex story, people who “meet DSM-IV
criteria for MDD” are, in effect, reduced to caricature so as
to be fitted into what an RCT logically demands—that for
all intents and purposes, groups of subjects are the same on
factors (other than the treatment) that could influence the
outcome that the trial aims to assess [15].
So, what is actually being treated in antidepressant drug
RCTs? The answer is: complex cases of emotional suffering
that presumably include conspicuous states of feeling
depressed, despondent, dispirited, demoralized, sad, blue,
betrayed, disappointed, unenergetic, apathetic, discouraged,
defeated, suicidal, etc. The attempt to define or discover
what depression really means as a medical–psychiatric
illness proposes there is an “it” to discover—like for
example the inability to produce insulin in type 1 diabetes—
that is separate from language use, meaning, context, and
social interaction. But, we repeat, there is simply no concept
or recognition of “depressed” stripped of story, context, social
expectations, norms, demands, etc. A broader, culturally
diverse perspective drives this home [16]. “Depression”
may be part of many medical conditions, but this does not
mean that everyone who looks or feels depressed suffers
from the same medical condition or that looking or feeling
depressed is a symptom of any medical condition. Whether
seen as a sign of a real medical disease or understood as a
feature of story, it makes no sense to refer to depression as
an independent illness [9]. We find it astonishing that that the
idea of “major depressive disorder” as an autonomous,
etiology-unknown, medical (medicalesque?) illness has the
currency it has.
All that subjects in an antidepressant drug RCT share is
that their emotional suffering can be described with
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expressions from the family of words that include “depres-
sion”. This bears little resemblance to patients diagnosed
because they share the same somatic pathology believed or
known to result from the same somatic cause. For example,
both in a nationwide epidemiological survey [17] and in an
RCT testing fluoxetine for depression in children and
adolescents [18], exactly four-fifths of subjects meeting
the diagnostic criteria for MDD were also diagnosed or
diagnosable with other DSM disorders, in which case, the
MDD diagnosis was rarely primary. In each instance, in
what way would these persons be considered to suffer from
“the same disorder”?
The RCT was developed in and for medicine, but is
applied in psychiatry at the cost of obscuring what is being
treated, with several far-reaching consequences as we
describe ahead. We have stressed that the key concept for
understanding an individual’s personal problems is story,
not category or clinical entity. Clinicians or researchers may
routinely suppress or ignore story and highlight (usually)
one context-less feature, so as to conceptually create a
clinical entity or category. This does not, however, render
the people thus homogenized the same in the manner that the
clinicians or researchers wish for and that the design of the
RCT in medicine requires. If this argument has validity, then
the whole point of conducting an antidepressant RCT breaks
down.
Neglecting the placebo response
The RCT has become the standard test for drug manufac-
turers to establish the efficacy (and some of the safety) of
drugs for specific DSM-IV indications. Efficacy only means
demonstrating some kind of effect, or “proof in principle”.
Large RCTs seem used especially when an expected
treatment effect is relatively small or when there is
spontaneous variation in the condition being treated [19].
If a drug is clearly efficacious, it should be efficacious even
in small trials, and results of efficacy should be routinely
replicable. Clinical trials of selective serotonin reuptake
inhibitors (SSRIs) demonstrate nowhere near this level of
efficacy; at best, they show weak, marginal effects in
comparison to placebo in the treatment of MDD. In other
words, placebo effects are usually quite large in antidepres-
sant RCTs, which poses a problem in the assessment of
drug effects beyond placebo.
Kirsch et al. [20] reanalyzed all data obtained from the
Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA’s) evaluations of
the 47 RCTs funded and submitted to it by the makers
of the six most widely prescribed antidepressants approved
by the FDA between 1987 and 1999. The reanalysis found
that 82% of the response of medicated patients was
duplicated in placebo-treated patients, despite the FDA
allowing the replacement of subjects on two of the drugs
who were not improving after 2 weeks into the trial and
the concomitant administration of benzodiazepines to
patients in over half the trials (a practice that went
unreported in publications of these trials). On the chief
outcome measure, the Hamilton depression rating scale
(HAMD), the mean difference between drug and placebo
groups was a minute 1.8 points on the 50-point or 62-point
versions of the scale (a clinically insignificant but statisti-
cally significant difference).
We conducted a MEDLINE search on August 12, 2006
for past-year English-language first-time publications of
double-blind, placebo-controlled randomized trials of any
SSRI. This yielded seven reports of one geriatric, one
pediatric, and five adult trials of five different SSRIs,
conducted in three countries. Six trials involved depressed
patients (one including women with breast cancer) and one
looked at weight restoration in individuals diagnosed with
anorexia nervosa. In no trial did the SSRI exceed placebo
response on the primary endpoint. In three trials, placebo-
treated patients fared statistically significantly better [21–23],
and in four trials, placebo and SSRI group scores did not
differ statistically [24–27].
The high placebo response rates in both data sets were
observed despite most studies’ use of placebo-washout or
placebo run-in periods, wherein all subjects are abruptly
discontinued from any medications they may be taking and
placed on a pill placebo, so that early placebo responders
can be identified and excluded from those who will then
be randomized for the study. For example, in the 47 trials
reviewed by Kirsch et al. [20], any subject whose HAMD
score improved 20% or more during this period was
excluded from the study. As the point of all these trials is
to compare the efficacy of active medication treatment to
placebo treatment, it is by no means clear what the
rationale could be for excluding positive placebo respond-
ers. It is also unclear whether removing early placebo
responders increases drug–placebo differences at trial’s
end, but there is yet another issue. Because abrupt
discontinuation induces a state of withdrawal [28], trials
that begin with a washout “introduce a bias against the
subjects who advance to the placebo arm” [29, p. 32]. In at
least some subjects, these trials, in effect, compare a
centrally active drug against placebo in reducing symptoms
of drug withdrawal. Subjects randomized to take the drug—
which should mitigate withdrawal effects—could outper-
form subjects on placebo in various assessments of
distress. Unfortunately, the issue is not discussed in the
literature.
Also, high placebo response rates were observed despite
the placebos being “inert”, (e.g., flour) rather than “active”
(e.g., diphenhydramine). Psychotropic drugs have certain
effects, such as dry mouth or increased heart rate, which
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can serve as cues to patients and clinicians about which
treatment condition they are in. One way around this
problem is to use placebos without pronounced psychoac-
tive effects but with a somewhat similar profile of “side
effects” as the drug being tested. These placebos are
commonly called “active placebos”, and results from earlier
trials showed that active placebos produced greater placebo
response [30]. It was proposed that active placebos’
physical effects might trick subjects into thinking that they
were taking “real” medication, thus, amplifying the placebo
response. Conversely, in a study using inert placebos, the
truly outstanding adverse effects are likely to derive from
the group on medications, which would give clinicians a
cue about which treatment condition subjects are in and
might tilt clinicians’ observations toward amplifying the
medication response. Two reviews of these earlier trials [31,
32] have not settled the matter of the precise role of inert vs
active placebos, and one author suggests ignoring it
altogether because the studies are dated [33]. But the issue
remains relevant: if inert placebos produce equivalent or
superior response in the latest available RCTs, would active
placebos literally lay waste to response on “antidepressant”
drugs? We cannot answer this question because we were
unable to find a single RCT comparing an SSRI with an
active placebo. By comparison, in neurology, RCTs of pain
treatments frequently use active placebos. This void in the
psychiatric literature makes no scientific sense—but is
easily understandable from a political economy perspective,
wherein sponsors’ commercial imperatives shape the
pursuit of knowledge.
Finally, it is axiomatic in clinical research that subjects’
and researchers’ expectations may bias their ratings, which
is the reason for the double-blind RCT [15]. However,
subjects might recognize their treatment because of phys-
ical characteristics of drug or placebo, desirable or adverse
effects of the active drug, or cues given by the clinician
[34]. As most RCTs in psychiatry are said to be double-
blind [35], knowing whether the blind is violated seems
vital to interpret results. Researchers could ask patients and
clinicians to guess which substance they received and
estimate how much this differs from a chance guess, or
reanalyze results according to patients’ or observers’
guesses. The FDA does not require such checks and less
than one in 40 published RCTs mentions some effort to
ensure blindedness [36]—a sign that editors and peer
reviewers also ignore the issue.
Why the inert placebo is shown in tightly controlled
trials to “benefit” (like antidepressants, by rating scale score
reductions from baseline by the first week of treatment and
every week thereafter) up to half of people diagnosed with
MDD [37] emerges as a key question. Yet, it is obvious that
the field as a whole, at least that large portion of it that is
funded and controlled by the pharmaceutical industry, is
less interested in answering this question than in method-
ologically stamping it out.
Avoidance of studying psychiatric medications
as psychoactive drugs
Psychopharmacotherapy clinical trials differ greatly from
the usual case in medicine, as the treatment depends on the
drug being a psychoactive substance expected to alter, via
its neurophysiological effects, mental and emotional life
and behavior for the duration of the treatment (often
suggested to last indefinitely). The drug has certain (largely
unknown) effects on the central nervous system, but it is
being used as a treatment in a clinical trial only because it
has produced sedation, agitation, or catalepsy, etc., in
earlier animal (preclinical) and normal human (phase 1)
studies leading to the open trials (phase 2) and RCTs
(phase 3) on diagnosed individuals. The overriding
question thus becomes: What psychosocial alterations and
medical consequences (neurological and others) does the
regular use of a centrally active drug bring about short and
long-term?
A uniform answer is impossible because the drug will
not affect everyone identically. Answering the question
includes distinguishing desirable from undesirable effects,
identifying unambiguously adverse effects and withdrawal
effects. One must ascertain the drug’s psychosocial effects
on normal volunteers before testing the drug with psychi-
atrically diagnosed individuals because multiple copresent
personal difficulties confound the determination of these
effects, and distinguishing between possible desirable and
undesirable drug effects becomes very problematic. For
example, do selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors have
“antidepressant” properties or “emotional numbing” prop-
erties? [38] If the data collected during the RCT are mute
on whether the drug treated group has “improved” on the
basis of effects that could be construed as neuropatholog-
ical (emotional muting, unconcern, euphoria, etc.), just as
easily as therapeutic (decreased preoccupation with symp-
toms, lifting of depressed mood, etc.), then results from
placebo-controlled randomized trials mean little, even if
“favorable.” As we suggested in our earlier article [2],
RCTs are simply not designed to allow observers to make
a distinction between, say, “improved mood” while on a
SSRI as a return to normal from a depressed state or as a
sign of drug-induced frontal lobe damage [39]. If the
subject is taken seriously as a person whose distress can
only be understood historically and contextually, then, on
the face of it, the drug-treated person has no reason to feel
less distressed except for the action of the drug itself, but its
effects might not stand close examination. The RCT, again,
is simply not designed to evaluate the nature of “reduced”
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distress, upset, anxiety, etc., induced by a drug. Obviously,
individuals without psychiatric diagnoses must be enrolled
in this effort.
The necessity to document the drug’s neurological and
psychosocial effects on normal volunteers before its
investigatory clinical use is minimally recognized at best.
Phase 1 studies conducted by pharmaceutical companies
and sometimes submitted to the FDA as part of the drug
approval package seem to have a shadowy existence in
terms of how and why they are conducted, how data are
collected, coded, and interpreted, what is actually reported
to the FDA, and who has access to the original data [40]. It
does seem clear that phase 1 studies are primarily
conceived and conducted as toxicology studies (and
sometimes as “abuse liability” studies), not as human
psychoactive drug investigations—for which no established
study method exists.
Nonetheless, in addition to normal volunteers, other
informants who know the subject well and can observe the
subject in his/her natural environment should also contrib-
ute information. The consequences of drug discontinuation,
also from multiple informant perspectives, must be inves-
tigated. Finally, subjects’ accounts once definitely off the
drug (e.g., several months after the last dose) must be
compared to their accounts under the influence (Studies
with these features are actually conducted today, but only
with drugs that investigators and society unambiguously
label psychoactive [41]). Without such information from
undiagnosed normal volunteers, diagnosed persons have no
realistic basis on which to decide to be treated or not with
the drug. Unfortunately, the passage of time since the
publication of a famous study of dextroamphetamine effects
on normal prepubertal boys [42] illustrates how little impact
the demonstration had regarding assumptions of somatic
pathology and “therapeutic” drug effects in the psychiatric
literature on “attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder”
(ADHD).
Are RCTs in psychopharmacotherapy
just infomercials?
We hope to have made it clear enough that ascertaining the
full physical, psychological, and social consequences of
taking a psychoactive substance daily for a long period of
time constitutes a major, very complex undertaking.
Standard, short-term psychopharmacotherapy RCTs are
not designed for this undertaking, but for the much
narrower purpose of showing treatment superiority of one
drug over inert placebo or non-inferiority to another drug
used to treat the same condition. This is precisely why
RCTs have little relevance to clinical practice. In practice,
antidepressants are prescribed to very severe cases, very
mild cases, pregnant women, frail older people, illiterates,
people who would never accept to take a placebo—all cases
that are excluded from the vast majority of RCTs [43]. In
practice, drugs can be prescribed for months and years, not
the average 6- to 8-week duration of the RCT. In practice,
the majority of people treated with an SSRI have multiple
symptoms and are prescribed more than one psychoactive
drug simultaneously [44]. The effort made in RCTs to
exclude many people who will actually be exposed to the
drug in clinical practice and to limit exposure to one
indicated disorder opens an unbridgeable gap between
research and practice.
In both research studies and in clinical practice, that so
many suffering people treated with “safe and effective”
medications soon decline to continue taking them (e.g.,
42% of adults who initiated antidepressants between 1996
and 2001 discontinued them within 1 month, and only 28%
continued beyond 3 months [45]) invokes only laments of
noncompliance on the part of most psychiatrists [46]. In
medicine, it may be that clinicians usually know that the
burden of the treatment is less than the burden of the
disease in the long run, even if the patient does not know
this. But in psychiatry, course, outcome, and response to
treatment vary in the extreme. People treated with anti-
depressants may fare worse in the long run than people not
treated [47]. The burden of the drug may be severe and
long lasting, while the severity of the condition may be
mild and transitory. This reality is continually obscured by
“disease mongering”, meaning the relentless expansion of
defining human distress in all its guises and at all levels of
severity as “diseases” requiring drug treatment (see PLoS
Medicine, volume 3, issue 4, 2006, featuring six essays on
the topic).
Mostly, the drug treatment literature ignores the exis-
tence of psychotherapy. Psychotherapy research itself has
been distorted to compete with the supposed rapid efficacy
of drug treatment [48]. Exposure to centrally active drugs,
even for a long time, is usually regarded as the first and
only option—drugs are compared to inert placebo or to
other drugs (how fairly one drug is compared to another
depends a great deal on who is paying for the study [49]).
Such is the commitment to regarding personal difficulties in
the emotional realm as the socially visible signs of an
endogenous, idiopathic somatic disease that requires drug
treatment that “...life style modifications, which is widely
practiced [in medicine] for the prevention of relapse [in
various real somatic diseases] is not even considered in
clinical psychiatry...” [50], p. 129].
In summary, the typical psychopharmacotherapy clinical
trial might reasonably qualify as an infomercial: a commu-
nication aimed to promote a product in a supposedly
objective manner, but actually divorced from reality. In the
typical infomercial, the product performs well during
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impractical tests, its defects and disadvantages are not
hinted at, and the approving observers were bought.
Adverse drug reactions: understudied,
under-recognized, under-reported, underappreciated
We noted in our earlier paper [2] that serious ADRs are
rarely, if ever, reported in published RCTs, in contrast to an
unending stream of reports of serious ADRs appearing in
psychiatry journals based on open trials, retrospective chart
reviews, and observations made in clinical practice. With
respect to SSRIs, the list includes delayed orgasm/ejacula-
tion and anorgasmia [51–53], suicidal ideation [54],
lethargic/apathetic frontal lobe syndrome [39, 55], growth
suppression [56], hostility, aggression, and violence [57,
58], withdrawal reactions [27], and various forms of
behavioral toxicity [59]. We conjectured that this obvious
and glaring disparity (if one elects to notice it) probably
could be understood, at least in part, on the basis of
sponsorship and the resultant bias that sponsorship creates.
By waiting for patients to complain about a drug effect,
or by asking about unpleasant effects in open-ended
questions—rather than by systematically eliciting reports
from patients and extending the observation period—rates
of side-effects usually appear to be substantially low [60].
In outpatient trials, subjects are typically evaluated once a
week or less often, during relatively brief encounters with
clinicians who do not know them. In the first 11 published
reports of ADHD trials of atomoxetine, ten reports
described their methods for eliciting adverse effect infor-
mation in no more than the following: “open-ended
questioning”, “unsolicited reports”, “self-report”, “sponta-
neous report from parent or child”, or no methodology. The
criteria for reporting the adverse effects in the publication
varied even more: “reported in at least 5% of patients in any
treatment group,” “occurring in >10% of treatment group”,
“most frequent”, “most common”, “reported in at least 5%
of treatment group and statistically significantly more
frequent than placebo”, or no criteria [61]. Such derisory
methods underscore the irrationality of overemphasizing
the validity of the “causal” standard or conventional
placebo-controlled trial design in detecting “true” adverse
effects, or conversely, of systematically questioning the
drug-induced status of effects observed in routine clinical
practice or reported in “merely anecdotal” or “uncon-
trolled” case studies (On the other hand, even unmistakable
effects emerging in the “causal” placebo-controlled RCT,
such as double the rate of suicidal ideation in depressed
youths treated with antidepressants [54], can also be
intensely questioned—but, seemingly, only if they disturb
the relentlessly promoted portrait of the drugs as “safe and
effective”).
Another source for the disparity between RCT and other
treatment venue reports of adverse drug effects may be
widespread polypharmacy in ordinary clinical practice. For
example, based on challenge–dechallenge for 533 consec-
utive inpatient admissions over a 14-month period, an
8.1% rate of antidepressant-induced psychosis or mania
was observed [62]. Assessment (such as it is) of a drug’s
adverse effects in an RCT is a poor guide to what will occur
when the same drug is combined with other psychoactive
drugs. Indeed, among these inpatient admissions, polyphar-
macy was the rule. Many, if not most, of these patients
would have been excluded from an antidepressant RCT
because they were taking multiple drugs. However, patients
deliberately excluded from RCTs are nonetheless pre-
scribed, in clinical practice, the same drug that cannot be
studied on them—along with other drugs—for the same
indication or other indications. Thus, RCTs may simply
miss noticing adverse effects that frequently happen under
more realistic treatment circumstances. Of note, the
authors of the report convey a message of rapid remission
of mania or psychosis once dechallenge of the antidepres-
sant was instituted and other drugs were substituted.The
three clinical examples provided in the text all have rapid
happy endings, but no follow-up is described. We did not
detect any interest in the impact on the patient, from the
patient’s own perspective, of antidepressant-induced psy-
chosis or mania severe enough to require hospitalization.
Indeed, we are unaware of any report on ADRs, regardless
of severity and incidence, published in a psychiatry journal,
that suggests more than “increased vigilance” on the part of
prescribers. But it is uncertain what increased vigilance
should mean or what it can accomplish in clinical practice.
It is widely recognized that only a minuscule fraction
of ADRs are reported to the professional literature
or to regulatory bodies [63], so it is probably safe to
conclude that professional estimates of an antidepressant’s
“safety in use” (an FDA expression) represent a gross
underestimation.
Medawar and Herxheimer [64, p. 167] compared two
sources of accounts of antidepressant adverse effects: first-
person accounts sent by patients to Social Audit, and
“Yellow Card” reports sent in by physicians to the U.K.’s
Committee on Safety of Medicine (CSM). Different
portraits of drug safety emerged from these different
sources. “[Yellow Card reports] are mainly written in
doctors’ own words, usually a translation into medical
shorthand of what the patient says. This often entails some
misunderstanding or misinterpretation [on the part of CSM
coders] and inevitably omits much detail, especially the
personal and social consequences of unwanted drug effects.
These e-mails [sent to Social Audit] recorded major
problems for relationships, employment, and locomotion
(e.g., driving).”
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The research subject’s muted, absent,
or interpreted voice
If the only way to realistically depict the subject or patient’s
“personal difficulties” (DSM-IV’s axis 4 uses this expres-
sion) is in terms of a unique story that includes history and
dramatis personae, then it is unrealistic to become too
committed—in advance of hearing the story and awaiting
further developments—to a fixed idea or measure of a happy
ending (i.e., therapeutic gain, progress, benefit), such as a
50% reduction in baseline score of a rating scale. This is by
way of asserting that bringing a relevant “clinical” story into
existence (a story that addresses “what’s the matter?” with
this person) and addendums to the story (which address how
the person is doing now after x amount of treatment) must
honor that there is no single official version of the story.
Certainly, the patient’s own version cannot be ignored. But
in the conventional medical framework of psychiatric drug
treatment research, the patient’s own voice is either
eliminated or relegated to a distinctly inferior position. The
subject in an RCT is first rendered a “serviceable other” (or
caricature) with regard to “what’s the matter” to be fitted
into the RCT’s requirement of “disorder homogeneity”, then
rendered mute or irrelevant about how he or she is doing
during and at the conclusion of treatment. That is, the
treating psychiatrist–researcher speaks for the research
subject both with regard to clinical status and unwanted
drug effects (by structuring the research subject’s speaking/
reporting opportunities and by interpreting and “translat-
ing” what the research subject does say).
The taken-for-granted “necessity” for the psychiatrist–
researcher to authoritatively interpret what the subject says
and how the subject appears and to present the interpreta-
tion as the “primary” outcome seems so compelling that it
is rarely discussed. Why a disparity routinely exists
between the researcher-interpreted version of the treatment
outcome and the subjects’ own version—albeit limited by
the instruments the researcher provides [65, 66]—also
remains usually undiscussed. From start to finish of an
antidepressant RCT, the subject’s or patient’s own views of
personal troubles and treatment effects are regarded in the
usual medical fashion, that is, as possibly useful informa-
tion to be expertly evaluated [67]. But in psychiatry, little
objective scientific knowledge can be brought to bear on
how the patient looks, behaves, and what he or she says, so
one cannot confidently regard the patient’s own view of his
or her status at the conclusion of treatment as expendable.
In familiar medical treatment research parlance, this renders
the preferred or exclusive reliance on the psychiatrist’s–
researcher’s evaluations tantamount to a “surrogate” out-
come indicator.
In previous sections, we have made some suggestions
regarding more realistic study of drugs thought or hoped to
exert an antidepressant effect. We have emphasized, in this
section, that the patient’s own voice is muted or absent both
with regard to what is the problem and with regard to the
pros and cons of treatment. A main reason for quantifica-
tion of the patient’s views is to analyze group scores
statistically, as the patient will not naturally use numbers
when trying to convey his or her impressions. The
researcher creates numerical scores to represent the
patient’s problem at the start of treatment, during treatment,
at the end of treatment, and also lists side effects in terms of
presence or absence (rarely, of intensity), all for the purpose
of statistical analysis. The extent to which it is reasonable to
represent psychological matters numerically is, of course, a
critical topic in the history of psychology as a research
field. Probably, few would suggest that nothing of
importance is lost in the numerous translations of the
patient’s attempt to convey information through discourse
into numbers, and criticisms of conventional drug treatment
methodology and findings frequently amount to presenting
information narratively which is held to have been lost or
overlooked or buried by its transformation into scores on
one or more scales. It may be tedious to solicit narratives
from research subjects and to present what the subjects
actually said in the ultimate report to the various interested
parties, and it may be time-consuming for readers to
examine what patients actually said or to examine even
summaries of their discourse. Nevertheless, the patient’s
voice is lost in the usual approach to collecting and
analyzing data. We believe it sensible that ethnological
drug treatment studies be recognized as a critical compo-
nent of the overall drug treatment research enterprise so that
the voice of the patient is not lost from what is “known”
about drug treatment safety and efficacy.
The current status of scientific research, government
protection of the public, and expert medical opinion
In every section above, we omitted a focused discussion of
conflicts of interest and the industry’s dominance of
psychiatric drug treatment research, as a whole, although
this forms the backdrop for every topic addressed so far
[4, 68–72]. Because the RCT constitutes the principal
hurdle that drug manufacturers must pass to have their
products approved for marketing, they need, in the USA, to
only produce two RCTs showing their drug’s superiority to
placebo and/or equivalence to an existing drug for the same
indication to generate potentially astronomical profits. This
means that the design, conduct, analysis, and publication of
clinical trials are marketing issues for drug manufacturers
[73]. Unquestionably, the very purposes of these once-
presumably scientific activities are (for the bulk of clinical
trials today) to gain FDA approval of a drug and then to
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alter physicians’ prescribing behavior to increase the drug’s
market share [74]. Recognition of this fact has recently led
to what is regularly called “a crisis in the perceived
integrity of all clinical trials”, notably those involving the
SSRIs [4, 75–78]. In contrast with the rest of medicine,
however, only belatedly has the extent of the crisis begun to
be publicly acknowledged in psychiatric journals [35, 79].
Here follows, in dense form, a brief overview of the
topography, focusing on the SSRIs, and how different
social actors contribute to it and are caught in it. All the
members of the DSM-IV and DSM-IV-TR panels on “mood
disorders” and “schizophrenia and other psychotic disor-
ders” had financial ties to drug companies [80]. More than
half of the members of the FDA’s 18 expert advisory panels
had a direct financial interest in the drug or topic about
which they advised the FDA [81]. The FDA forbids its own
researcher from publishing findings on the risk of suicidal
ideation in children taking SSRIs [82], and the FDA’s own
lead counsel attempted to annul a federal judge’s order that
the makers of paroxetine stop making the misleading
advertisement claim that “Paxil is not habit forming” [83].
Medical schools in the U.S. routinely engage in industry-
sponsored research that fails to adhere to the International
Committee of Medical Journal Editors’ standards regarding
clinical trial design, access to data, and publication rights
[84]. When asked about certain serious adverse effects in
his two fluoxetine pediatric trials (one of which was funded
by a public agency and both of which were already
published), the lead academic investigator “declined to
disclose what he knew, invoking secrecy contracts he
signed with a pharmaceutical company” [85].
Pharmaceutical companies or their subcontractors enlist
academics to form expert panels to construct guidelines and
algorithms that assert or argue that newer, more expensive
drugs (SSRIs and atypical antipsychotics) are more effec-
tive and must become first-line treatments, in the absence of
definitive data or the presence of contradictory data [86]; in
some states, such algorithms are promoted by means of
covert, illicit cash payments to state officials responsible to
make the drugs eligible for government funding [87].
Professional writers are hired to pen articles of RCTs or
literature reviews, on which prominent academic names
appear who might have never seen, let alone analyzed, the
raw data [74, 88–90]. These articles have wider impact on
the field than articles on the same topics that are
independently written [91]. When the editor of the New
England Journal of Medicine sought a research psychiatrist
with no ties to the drug industry to evaluate an SSRI trial,
she could find none [92]. When the American Journal of
Psychiatry published a pediatric RCT of citalopram which
reported positive results, neither the authors nor the editors
disclosed (or knew) that a previous unpublished pediatric
RCT funded by the same sponsor had observed opposite
results [93, 94]. When an article in JAMA warned pregnant
women not to stop antidepressants because of the risk of
reexperiencing depression, most of the 13 authors did not
disclose their financial ties to makers of antidepressants
[95]. When all 42 RCTs of five SSRIs submitted to the
Swedish drug regulatory authority as a basis for marketing
approval (and unavailable to practitioners) were compared
with the reports from these RCTs actually published in the
literature, researchers found evidence of multiple publica-
tion, selective publication, and selective reporting [96].
A research group on adverse drug events reported,
without intentional irony, that “the legal system is becom-
ing an increasingly important participant in postmarketing
safety assessments” because lawsuits against manufacturers
enable expert witnesses to access company documents that
are not normally available to anyone, and although
unpublished clinical trials and safety reports from industry
would greatly facilitate identifying ADRs, “these data are
not easily obtained” [97]. Drug companies routinely fail to
carry out postmarketing safety (phase 4) studies required by
the FDA [98]. “[O]nly half of newly discovered serious
ADRs are detected and documented in the [Physician’s
Desk Reference] within 7 years of drug approval” [97]. The
direct patient ADR reporting system created in the Nether-
lands identified nine new ADRs for paroxetine about
273 days before the same ADRs were identified by the
Netherlands Pharmacovigilance Foundation based on phy-
sician reports [99]. Since the 1992 adoption in the U.S. of
the Prescription Drug User Fee Act (i.e., drug manufac-
turers seeking product approval from the FDA directly pay
the FDA), median approval times for nonpriority drugs
decreased from 27 months in 1993 to 14 months in 2001,
but as “an inevitable consequence” drug recalls increased
from 1.6% for 1993–1996 to 5.3% in 2001 [81].
Conclusion: whither drug research?
American biopsychiatry or neo-Kraepelinism has postulated
for the past 30 years that the entire spectrum of “clinically
significant” human misery and/or psychosocial deviance is
“really” based on endogenous biological faults, and it has
enlisted (or become a satellite branch of) the multinational
drug industry to promote its postulate. The industry is itself
increasingly oblivious to the scientific relevance of its
activities as long as they remain profitable and is only too
eager to spend whatever is necessary to maintain the
alliance intact [100]. It is difficult to imagine how the
psychiatric drug research industry will change from within,
as long as no actor is pressed to account for the failure to
deliver on promises (i.e., to find the twisted molecule
behind every twisted thought and to provide safe and
effective treatments).
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Of course, changes from without are unceasing and
powerful, but there is no obvious indication of where the
field is headed. Two related trends are apparent: the
increasing irrelevance of medical experts and medical
intermediaries (encouraged by direct-to-consumer advertis-
ing of pharmaceuticals) and the construction of knowledge
about psychotropic drugs moving completely beyond the
traditional confines of medical research (made possible by
the Internet and its ability to give direct, uninterpreted voice
to laypersons) [101]. The implications of these two
developments are far from clear. But for our part, we
suggest that the entire drugs-as-first-line-treatment-for-
personal-problems research enterprise has turned a blind
eye to two fundamental principles: (a) “In approaching [the
issue of exposure to chemicals and toxicity] it is indeed
instructive to take as a starting point the extreme position:
that the effects of chemicals on organisms are mostly bad”
[102]; (b) “Like all psychotropic agents, the behavioral and
neuropharmacological effects of fluoxetine are complex and
variable” [103, our italics].
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